Introduction
For the early French Revolutionaries, the concept of the nation did not serve as a vehicle for territorial states' exclusionist practices. Neither did they conceive of national identity primarily as a criterion by which to distinguish between "us" and "them". For them, the concept of the nation gave expression to the radical idea of an inclusive political community based the concept of popular sovereignty, equality and unalienable rights. However, the territoriality of global political organisation led to a different role for nationalism on the global political stage than which could have been foreseen by the early Revolutionaries.
Contemporary nationalism is defined by the very distinction between "us" and "them" and its original promise of individual rights and freedoms often seems to be in direct contradiction with everyday reality. I will argue below that the reason for this has to be sought at least partly in the process of territorialisation.
Territorialisation, a process that links political authority to clearly delimited space, has led to the notion of sovereignty as an abstraction that links state, people, identity and territory in a way that is presented as natural and inextricable.
National citizenship is thus seen as the primary political identity, while the adjective national has simultaneously acquired a pre-political aureole on account 2 of stubborn myths of the shared blood and history of the "people" that underpin the concept of popular sovereignty. As a result, the territorially fixed population has become one of the foundations of the concept of sovereignty. Consequently, the modern state guards its territorial boundaries jealously and strictly, especially with regard to the movement of persons, because "when the rules for differentiating between the inside and the outside become blurred and ambiguous, the foundations of sovereignty become shaky." 1 It is sometimes argued that the fundamental status of the territorial/nation state and its citizens in the global political system is changing. According to this view, sovereign states are increasingly limited in their use of territorial borders to maintain a strict divide between "inside" and "outside"; "us" and "them". As a result, a post-Westphalian constellation is slowly developing of which allegedly post-national political entities such as the European Union offer the best example.
2 However, there are also scholars who have described an opposite trend over the last decades and who claim that globalisation has forced states to think of novel ways to protect traditional borders, both of territory and of community. 3 In the specific European context, it has for example been argued that national states have shifted high politics as immigration policy making upwards to the EU in order to circumvent national policy constraints as have been formulated by domestic judiciaries. 4 It has also been said that national "concerns to maintain and protect borders of work, welfare and citizenship" have shaped EU policy making to regulate human mobility. The overall result of the self-evidence with which the link between the foreigner and territorial exclusion has been retained in Europe has made the movement rights of third-country nationals subject to a legal framework that is unnecessarily complicated and contradictory, and which, in important respects, fails to live up to the demands of the rule of law.
Territorial Sovereignty, the Nation-State and Exclusion
According to Andrew Geddes, territorial borders are "typically understood as the sites at which the sovereign authority of the state to exclude is exercised". 8 However, territorial borders are not only sites where the sovereign power to exclude comes most clearly (and often most brutally) to the fore. In addition, and perhaps more fundamentally, they have also played a central role in the development of modern sovereignty whose function it is to distinguish the inside from the outside. As such, they have determined the particular way in which this inside and outside have been constructed by establishing a seemingly self-evident relation between sovereignty and modern concepts of nation and identity. Indeed, territorialisation, the process by which political authority came to be linked to clearly demarcated territorial units, profoundly influenced the way in which the modern state conceives of identity and political community. An inquiry in the relationship between territorial borders, immigration and sovereignty is much needed in a political climate where the exclusion of "outsiders" is increasingly perceived as both natural and justified on account of the state's territorial sovereignty.
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Contemporary political discourse portrays the right to control the entry and stay of non-nationals as inherent in the state's sovereign claims over its territory.
The link between immigration and notions of territorial sovereignty is most explicit in right-wing populist discourse -now common in all EU Member States -that adopts a rhetoric of "threat", "crisis", and "invasion" to address problems associated with immigration. But also more mainstream approaches by policy makers and judiciaries disclose a view that does not doubt the legality of the national state's claim to exclude non-nationals on account of its territorial sovereignty, albeit presently subject to some exceptions based on human rights obligations of the state. Such a view seems to be largely derived from the notion of the inviolability of territorial boundaries in classical international law, a discourse almost exclusively about the rights and duties of states towards each other and in which the interests of the individual as such did not feature. 9 The preponderance of powerful claims by the state that are derived from its territorial sovereignty on the legal regime of immigration control is exacerbated by the current trend in which immigration is increasingly portrayed as a security issue.
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The contemporary discourse of societal security draws likewise from the vernacular of the "invading enemy" 11 , traditionally reserved for war and other threats to the territorial integrity of the modern state in the past.
An approach to the right to regulate immigration that draws so directly from a legal discourse in which the sanctity of territorial boundaries is paramount could only come about as a result of a perception in which individuals' relationships to territory are static and in which each and everyone of them 9 The discourse that addresses immigration as engaging first and foremost territorial sovereignty to which the state has an absolute claim originates from the way in which international law addresses armed conflict between sovereign states and dates from the late 18 th century. See for example the U.S Supreme Court in the Chinese Exclusion Case: "to preserve its independence, and give security against foreign aggression and encroachment, is the highest duty of every nation, and to attain these ends nearly all other considerations are to be subordinated. Thus, territorialisation of political organisation had largely become a fact by the time that the predominant mode of legitimising political authority consisted in an appeal to the sovereignty of the people. Indeed, the very process of territorialisation made possible the emergence of a notion as abstract as popular sovereignty: its very abstraction one of the characteristics that distinguished popular sovereignty from earlier theories by which men had attempted to legitimise political authority. A new idea was needed to imagine the novel idea of the body politic governed by the people, just as a new political identity had to be devised to give expression to political equality. The nation became the allcompassing political entity that was the source of sovereignty and equality, and citizenship indicated membership in the political community called the nation.
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However, the insidious result of the fact that the notion of popular sovereignty came to be executed in a system of separate and independent political entities, demarcated by way of territorial borders, was that the enlightenment ideals on which the concept of the people was based quickly lost their universalistic connotations of a common humanity. Instead, they transformed into a particularistic conception of the nation constituted by the people whose bonds to each other were supposedly pre-political. regards territorial borders as sacrosanct and that clings to the illusion of the territorially defined nation state as a closed container of society.
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In such a discourse there is little room for articulation of the individual interests that are actually implicated in the dominant perception of territorial sovereignty. The fact that modern international law has delegitimised historical forms of territorial exclusion while it has simultaneously naturalised the link between such exclusion and foreign nationals serves to highlight the distinction that has been made within the concept of sovereignty by the modern rule of law:
while it has increasingly offered ways in which to hold accountable the jurisdictional content of sovereign power whenever that is exercised over a welldefined group of people within a certain clearly demarcated territory, it has largely remained indifferent whenever the state presents the exercise of its power as based on sovereignty's territorial form. 
Third-Country Nationals and European
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States have not seized the opportunity provided by the process of European integration to reflect seriously on post-national conceptions of political community. This is so because, notwithstanding the fact that notions of inside and outside within Europe may have been shifting in important -and perhaps unprecedented -ways as a result of the establishment of the internal market and integration in more general terms, the legal regime regulating movement by thirdcountry nationals across both external and internal borders remains for a large part moulded according to traditional conceptions of the link between national sovereignty and territorial exclusion of the individual who is defined as the other.
In section 3.1., I will address the free movement rights of third-country nationals in the 'area without internal frontiers' in order to show that the internal border is far from being abolished in Europe. In this section, specific attention will be paid to the Chen case because the UK government's contentions in that case provide an excellent example of a Member State's strategic -albeit disguised -use of the national sovereign paradigm as soon as it perceives an endangering of the link between territorial exclusion and the foreigner as a result of European integration. Furthermore, this Section will pay attention to the current confusion that surrounds the precise extent of the movement rights that third-country nationals may enjoy in their quality as family members of EU citizens. We will see that recent case law of the ECJ shows that the precise delimitation of competences between the EU and its Member States in this area is far from clear, resulting in unnecessarily complicated and contradictory case law by the ECJ.
After that, in section 3.2., I will focus on the common immigration policy and the crossing of external borders. Instead of analysing the bulk of legislation that has been enacted under Title IV of the EC Treaty, I will investigate if and how EU law and policy-making in this area has changed traditional understandings of territoriality, sovereignty and exclusion. And although we will see that certain changes have indeed occurred, I will argue that these changes have mostly been triggered by Member States' wishes to strengthen the kind of sovereign power that they deem necessary for protecting precisely that what is defined by the internal border. Community law concerning free movement rights sets these two categories clearly apart, and third-country nationals only benefit from freedom of movement in a way that could be described as indirect and partial.
While EU citizens benefit from extensive freedom of movement rights between the Member States, the Treaty provisions on freedom of movement are not applicable to third-country nationals as such. It is important to note that other fields of EC law are much more inclusive of third-country nationals, such as the rules on free movement of capital or transfer of undertakings, consumer law and transport policy, and rules regarding working conditions and social security 27 Article 3(c) EEC Treaty. that decisions by the ECJ in this field seem to have been derived rather from a "case-by-case assessment that is very much based on the facts which gave to the reference" than from a consistent and hermeneutic approach to EC law. 51 The legal vagueness surrounding this issues, and the refusal of the ECJ to squarely address it in Jia, 52 exemplify that in the absence of a common regime regarding free movement rights of third-country nationals within the EU, the crossing of internal borders cannot be seen in isolation from the delimitation of competences between the European Union and its Member States with regard to external border crossings and first-admittance decisions. In this sense, competence skirmishes do not only concern the relation between the Community and its Member States, but they can also lead to considerable confusion as regards the legal framework that addresses the rights of third-country nationals in terms of EC law. This is because, as will be dealt with below, EC competence with regard to external border crossings is only created within the limited context of Title IV of the EC Treaty, which in turn has been characterised as an "institutional ghetto" within that Treaty.
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Internal border crossings and the national quality of persons thus remain firmly linked in the EU. For the EU to be "post-national", it would arguably have to deconstruct more radically the link between nationality and entitlement to internal free movement. As it is now, for non-nationals of the Member States, internal borders are not disappearing at all: national sovereignty is still a factor of crucial importance when they want to move from the territory of one Member State to another. This is not to say that the creation of the single market has not made a difference for them too, caused by the fact that the physical border is free of control. But instead of according them more freedom, the absence of these controls combined with Member States' insistence on their exclusionary powers vis-à-vis third-country nationals, has led to a situation in which, quoting Malcolm
Anderson and Didier Bigo, "controls are still there, but now over the whole of the territory, although perhaps not applied to everyone, but certainly to persons categorised as dangerous and especially as "unwelcome migrants with dark skins." 
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Convention. 61 The explicit intention of such cooperation is the transferral of the rules the participating states have agreed upon to the level of the EU. Even though such intergovernmental cooperation may be motivated by a genuine wish of some Member States to achieve closer integration, the inevitable result is that checks on the executive power are largely absent: the European Parliament for example has no say on the proceedings and outcomes within these multilateral frameworks.
The measures and policies which have been taken so far as a result of the "shift upwards" -denoting the transferring of migration decision making from the national to the Community level 62 -exemplify that strong emphasis is laid on traditional control of the territorial border. 63 In spite of the comprehensive approach to be taken to migration as was proclaimed indispensable at Tampere,   64 legislation and other instruments such as on harmonising existing practices on expulsions, 65 mutual recognition of expulsion decisions, 66 voluntary repatriation, 67 the organisation of joint flights for expulsion, 68 and controlling illegal immigration in a more general sense, 69 all point to all point to Member States' 23 strong commitment to a rigid territory-identity link. In this respect, it is significant that policy making under Title IV of the EC Treaty is strongly unbalanced in favour of measures that emphasise security and border control. 70 Apart from an upward shift, Member States have externalised migration control through various EU policies, in what can be described as a shift "outwards". 71 They have done so in different ways which all lead to a separation between the concept of the border and the perimeter of European territory. 72 The first of such policies is the Schengen system of visa regulation. 73 The States outside the territory of the EU, thereby facilitating the contracting out of asylum services to third countries. 84 It is persuasively argued by several authors that significant legal obstacles would be encountered in realising these plans, 85 which perhaps explains why they have not been adopted by the Commission. States' reluctance to abolish the function of the internal border with regard to third-country nationals and the ensuing consequences for the delimitation of competences between the EU and its Member States with regard to the admission of third-country nationals who are family members of EU citizens has also led to inconsistency and inequality in the legal regime regulating their rights of free movement. 99 We have seen that the motives underlying the Europeanization of policy-making regarding immigration into the EU show that the process of integration in this field is similarly driven by a deeply felt wish to maintain the traditional role of territorial boundaries in protecting the identity of the nation state. Law and policy making under Title IV of the EC Treaty has thus far put strong emphasis on protecting the territorial border by preventing new arrivals and fighting 'illegal' migration. The way in which Member States choose to focus on integration with regard to the protection of territorial borders, and find it much more difficult to achieve integration in the field of legal migration, affirms that they prioritise the relation between territorial sovereignty and modern concepts of nation and national identity. Similarly, the adoption by the EU of Member States' own security discourse 100 when addressing migration signifies an inability to break away from traditional perceptions in which immigration is mainly seen as a threat to the territorial integrity of the state.
Precisely the making of a European immigration policy and the shaping of a legal framework regulating the status of third-country nationals within Europe could have provided an opening to question stubborn and reified notions about the link between territorial sovereignty and exclusion of the foreigner. The fact that this opportunity has not been grasped is not merely a theoretical issue, but "the obduracy of the national border" in Europe deeply influences the rights and freedoms of the individual. In the first place, this is so because the perception of a self-evident relation between territorial sovereignty and exclusion of the foreigner makes that we lose sight of the individual that is actually affected by exclusionary 99 See also A-G Geelhoed in his opinion to the Jia Case. Moreover, the fact that these policies are increasingly taking form at the European level makes it more difficult to raise broader public awareness and debate. The way in which Member States work together at preventing what they call illegal immigration -by intercepting migrants in the coastal waters of West Africaprovides a good example of just such tendencies: these practices are barely subjected to any democratic accountability, not at all to any form of judicial control and public debate concerning the legality of such measures is negligible. 101 And although some attention has been paid to these practices in academic debate, the main focus there has been on the interests of asylum seekers and refugees.
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The fact that the interests of irregular immigrants have mostly been ignored raises the impression that intercepting "mere migrants" raises no fundamental questions. The recurring emphasis on asylum seekers and refugees in critical appraisals of EU policies is understandable in view of their particular vulnerable position and need of protection. However, if these appraisals fail to address the more fundamental sovereign assumptions that underlie contemporary immigration policies in general they run a risk of resulting in an affirmation of the dominant discourse in which mere immigration -unqualified by international refugee law or a limited amount of human rights -is portrayed as engaging solely territorial sovereignty. The result of such a discursive approach to immigration is 101 And although the Reform Treaty introduces the ordinary legislative procedure for measures related to border checks, asylum and immigration, in Article 66a, the Treaty also explicitly allows for Member States to organise between themselves and under their responsibility such forms of cooperation and coordination as they deem appropriate between the competent departments of their administrations responsible for safeguarding national security.
